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BIOETHICS AND DEMOCRACY: COMPETING ROLES OF NATIONAL
BIOETHICS ORGANISATIONS

1. INTRODUCTION
The establishment of international, transnational and national bioethics bodies
has marked the development of bioethics in the last three decades.

At

international meetings of such bodies, in conjunction with the World Congresses
of Bioethics in since 1996, up to 36 nations have been represented1. The
establishment of these national bioethics organisations (NBOs) reflects the public
importance attached to the bioethical issues that have emerged from rapid
advances in health care provision, health technology and medical research and
their implications for human lives, social relations and state responsibilities.

The charters, objectives and processes of these NBOs are likely to influence the
impact that ethics may have in the development of national policy and the effect
such policy developments may have on the character and development of
bioethics.

Some important differences in the roles of these bodies raise

questions about how the structures and procedures of NBOs affect their
influence, on health and medical research policy development and in articulating
bioethical debate. This paper examines tensions between the structure, focus
and processes of NBOs and realisation of the democratic goals that are explicitly
or implicitly reflected in the speeches or policy documents establishing NBOs.
We argue for a consultative and contestable approach through which NBOs can
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fulfil their roles in bioethical debate and in policy formation while preserving these
democratic goals.

2.

BIOETHICS AND THE DEMAND FOR PUBLIC POLICY

In establishing NBOs, states seek to establish processes that allow a diversity of
views to be heard in a manner that is well informed, articulate, and responsive to
both expert and “lay” public views. NBOs are typically given a range of
responsibilities, including
•

contributing to and stimulating public debate,

•

providing expert opinion in identifying relevant issues that need to be
addressed in policy deliberations, and/or

•

developing public policy.

Areas of life, such as reproduction or access to health care, previously thought by
liberal theorists to be wholly a matter of individual choice, and not a matter of
public policy, regulation or legislative control, are now recognised by many
researchers, practitioners, legislators and citizens to be matters about which the
state has an interest. The source of this interest may be the state’s role as a
provider of welfare services, or as a protector of individual rights, or as a
defender of a “common way” or shared set of values. Each of these justifications
for regulation could be viewed, in a particular case, as excessive state
interference on liberal grounds, nonetheless, these positions have been put
forward in recent years in a range of public, legislative and academic fora.
Decisions about whether or not to regulate areas such as research involving
expensive or risky medical technologies, use of stem cells in research or in
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therapy, or cloning, are usually the outcome of a deliberation informed by public
debate or in response to public outcry. NBOs can contribute to these decisions in
varying ways. They can open up the public debate by promoting expression of
the diversity of community views, clarifying that expression so that it is wellinformed, articulate and responsive to both expert and ‘lay’ public views and can
directly contribute to policy formation.

In this paper we are interested in policy development that can be described as
“bioethical policy”. That is, where (1) the policy is recognised as involving
contentious ethical debate in the areas of health and medical research, and (2)
the policy process has been designed to reflect diversity of opinion and of ethical
frameworks and seeks legitimacy through processes of public consultation. We
are particularly interested in examining the capacity of NBOs to meet the
democratic ideal of effective participation by the public, or citizenry—especially
those people directly affected by the policies—in the development of effective
public policy. We provide a basic framework for policy development involving
NBOs that could meet this ideal.

3. NATIONAL BIOETHICS ORGANISATIONS
Our concern with the capacity of NBOs to inform and reflect the diversity of
values within a state on a bioethical policy issue in shaping policy, leads us to
focus on a typical kind of NBO. The organisations to which our attention is
directed are entities established by national governments, usually with a statutory
base and a permanent existence, subject to periodic renewals of membership.
While their terms of reference, roles, functions and tasks vary, what they have in
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common is that their activities are directed to bioethical matters. Their concerns
address areas of policy and legislation that are explicitly recognised to be
ethically contentious: ethical issues in the provision of health care, the
development and deployment of health care technology and the conduct of
research in health related areas.

Because our present interest is in the relationships between and among these
bodies, bioethics, liberal democracy and the development of government policy,
we have not included international and transnational bioethics bodies, such as
the Steering Committee on Bioethics of the Council of Europe and the more
specialist ethics committee of the Human Genome Organisation (HUGO).
Although we do not examine them, we recognise that the deliberations of these
bodies may influence the development of national bioethics policy.

We exclude two types of national body. The first are bodies formed for narrow
and specific inquiries, often into past conduct that has been ethically suspect.
Examples of these include the Australian Inquiry into the Use of Pituitary Derived
Hormones and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease2, the United States inquiries into the
Tuskegee3 and the radiation experiments4 conducted by government agencies.
These inquiries may have important policy contributions to make and often
represent new steps in government transparency, expose shortcomings of past
regulatory systems and clarify how those can be remedied for the future. It is the
narrow focus of their work and output and their short life that limits their on-going
influence on policy development.
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The second are national non-government NBOs: bodies with national standing
but only indirect government links whose members are appointed by nongovernment processes and government is included among those to whom the
body reports. An example of this kind of committee is the National Council on
Ethics in Human Research of Canada. It has a wide range of tasks mostly related
to the operation of research ethics boards (REBs) that consider and approve
proposals for health related research involving humans. The Council reports to
Health Canada, the Medical Research Council of Canada, the Natural Sciences
and Engineering Research Council of Canada, the Royal College of Physicians
and Surgeons Council and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada and other participating organisations. Although its status is
likely to give weight to any recommendations that require state involvement, the
indirect links with government are important points of distinction from those NBOs
to which our primary attention is directed. To re-state: we are concerned to
examine those NBOs that are established by governments as enduring bodies
that can have a constant role in shaping bioethics policy.

4. ADVISORY AND POLICY -MAKING NBOs
4.1

Specific and general NBOs

Some NBOs are established with specific terms of reference or tasks but need to
address bioethical issues in their performance and can take on a regulatory
function. Among clear examples are the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority of the United Kingdom and the National Ethics Committee on Assisted
Reproduction of New Zealand.
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The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority of the United Kingdom was
established by regulation following recommendations in the 1984 report of the
Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology.5 The Authority’s
principal role is to license and monitor clinics that carry out in vitro fertilisation,
donor insemination and research with human embryos as well as the storage of
human gametes. It is also required to produce a Code of Practice for the conduct
of licensed activities; keep a register of information about donors, treatments and
children born from those treatments; publicise its role, provide advice to patients,
doctors and clinics, keep under review information about human embryos,
developments in regulated treatments and activities and advise the Secretary of
State, if asked, about these matters. The Authority would clearly need to address
ethical issues, but only those relevant to embryology.

The New Zealand National Ethics Committee on Assisted Reproduction was
established by statute to review new and untried or innovative assisted human
reproductive proposals of national importance. It is also required to develop
protocols and guidelines to assist ethics committees to review such proposals
and provide advice to the Ministers and National Advisory Committee on Health
and Disability.

Although such NBOs work only on specified subjects, they can make important
contributions to public bioethics policy development on those subjects.

Typical NBOs have been established by government with broad general terms of
reference that are centred on ethical issues in health. For our purposes, these
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NBOs can be divided into two categories: advisory NBOs and policy making
NBOs. Advisory NBOs articulate debate about the ethical issues involved in any
area of potential policy formation and may also respond to proposed policy in
advising the public. Accordingly, their influence on policy is indirect. Policy
making NBOs have, as a specific role, the development of bioethical policy; so
that their influence on policy is direct.

4.2 Advisory NBOs
Some bodies have a general power to respond to issues directed to them from
the public and to provide advice directly to the inquirer, the response becoming
available as a public document. For example, the Danish Council on Ethics
position paper on micro-insemination and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis sets
out the ethical misgivings of eight members and the arguments that another nine
members regarded as outweighing those misgivings.6 What is relevant about this
process is that government has no priority in receiving the Council’s responses to
public requests for advice or opinion. Further, the advice of the Council reflects
the multiple positions supported or supportable, it is not required or intended to
represent public or expert consensus on the issue. Membership of these bodies
usually covers a wide range of expertise and includes only those of recognised
merit in fields relevant to the scope of the body’s terms of reference: these need
not be consultative bodies. Commonly, select sub-groups or individuals are
designated responsibility for developing opinions in response to requests. We
describe these as ‘NBOs that are advisory and able to make open contributions
to public bioethics debate’.
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Among bodies with such powers are the Belgian Advisory Committee on
Bioethics, the Finnish National Advisory Board on Health Care Ethics, the French
National Consultative Ethics Committee for Health and Life Sciences and the
Portuguese National Council of Ethics for the Life Sciences.

4.3 Policy-making NBOs
NBOs that do not have such direct public advisory powers are those national
government established bodies whose characteristic mode of reporting is first to
a government agency. We call these ‘NBOs with defined policy-making roles’.
While it is a matter of debate whether (and when) ethical matters, including
bioethical matters, ought to be regulated through public policy, governments
increasingly rely on NBOs to provide policy advice that may contribute to legal
prohibitions on some activities (e.g. human cloning), conditions on access to
public funding (e.g. access to public health research funds) or guidelines for
clinical practice (e.g. guidelines on use of reproductive technologies). Clear
examples of NBOs with these policy roles are the now-defunct United States
National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) and the current Australian
Health Ethics Committee (AHEC).

NBAC was established by Presidential Executive Order in October 1995 and
lapsed in October 2001.

The current President's Council on Bioethics was

established in November 2001. NBAC was required to report to the National
Science and Technology Council (NSTC) or other Federal agencies prior to
making public its recommendations and advice: it was not required to consult
public opinion, nor to seek consensus. It was required to respond to requests for
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advice from the NSTC, could accept suggestions from Congress or the public
concerning issues to be examined and could, subject to approval from the NSTC,
identify other issues for examination.

The following were the criteria for

determining priority for activities:
•

public health or policy urgency,

•

relations of bioethics issues to goals of Federal investment in science and
technology,

•

absence of another suitable body, and

•

the extent of interest in the issue across the government.

The integration of NBAC into government processes was also evidenced by the
power of the Commission to direct recommendations to departments or agencies
and request responses within designated periods.

The Australian Health Ethics Committee was established by the Minister for
Health in exercise of the power and requirement in section 35 of the National
Health and Medical Research Council Act 1992 (Clth). The statutory functions of
AHEC are to advise the National Health and Medical Research Council
(NHMRC) on ethical issues relating to health, to develop and give the Council
guidelines for the conduct of medical research involving humans and such other
functions as the Minister determines. It is required to report to the Council, which
in turn issues approved documents. Other than the specific reference to medical
research involving humans, there is no provision relating to the sources from
which AHEC can derive issues for its work. AHEC can be said, then, to have a
specific responsibility to develop national policy governing research involving
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human participants. Its membership comprises experts and representatives of
specific interest groups thought to be commensurate to that task. Unlike NBAC,
AHEC is required, under the Act, to pursue a public consultation process in
relation to the health matters it considers. The scope of its public contribution to
bioethical debate is framed by that policy role.

5 . NBOs IN PLURALIST LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES
In this section we explore alternative theoretical approaches to recognition of
diversity in democracies, in the next section we show how these relate to the
structure, role and processes of those NBOs with advisory roles and those with
defined policy-making roles.

Our specific concern is to consider the relative merits of the two kinds of roles for
NBOs: those whose roles are primarily advisory and those with a mandated
policy-development role. We use contemporary work on democracy and public
rationality to demonstrate our argument. All NBOs appointed by governments are
influenced by governmental concerns (e.g. in membership and terms of
reference). It is our view, however, that those NBOs with a genuinely advisory
role may be better able to reflect the diversity of public and specialist opinion
about important ethical matters affecting communities and thereby meet certain
democratic goals of participation and public reasoning, than those NBOs that
have a specific bioethics policy-making function.

By comparison, although those NBOs with specific policy-making responsibilities
will have greater impact on practice, they are likely to be constricted in reflecting
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a range of ethical opinion by the demands of legislative and policy-making
structures (e.g. the need to produce policy which is univocal, thus papering-over
diversity—abstracting different orders of disagreement under a single banner
view, that policy needs to respect differences in value). Those NBOs that, in their
advisory role, are expected to initiate public debate and to articulate the range of
significant ethical standpoints on the issue under consideration may be seen to
provide a better starting point for genuine democratic consideration of bioethical
issues to be addressed by policy.

In summary, an NBO with an expert membership but primarily an advisory
mandate can initiate debate or respond informatively to a debate initiated
elsewhere about bioethical policy matters, because its membership includes
articulate experts who can engage in reasoned discussion and deliberation
grounded in distinct views. While advisory NBOs may not, in practice, reflect the
diversity of public views on a bioethical topics, their structure better allows for
realisation of deliberative ideals of public reasoning (discussed further in the next
section). An advisory NBO has greater chance of reflecting a diversity of views
and presenting that diversity clearly so as to widen public debate through
informed and articulate intervention. Having so contributed to debate, the NBO
would be able to explain the significance of the range of possible responses and
to ‘road test’ public and ‘expert’ reactions to those alternatives. This approach
would allow for a clearer engagement between the ethical issues (and their
sources) in the debate and more clearly defended public responses into the
policy process.
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An NBO with expert representative membership and a defined policy making
role, by contrast, is likely to have a membership less representative of the
diversity of people holding strongly held views about the issue than advisory
committees, due to the selection of members based on their expertise and
capacity to resolve on policy. That is, insofar as the range of representatives or
experts consulted is restricted by the demands of the policy-making process,
subordinated view points are less likely to be reflected in their membership.
Diversity is more likely to be restricted to a set range of positions demanded by
the policy framework (e.g. there will be representatives of one or two major
religions, not representing the range of religious perspectives that may have
specific concerns with a proposed area of policy development). Such NBOs are
also likely to anticipate only a limited range of ethical viewpoints and expert
positions, and therefore not fully represent in their considerations the diversity of
issues raised in the wider public debate. Further, they are likely to be driven by
political necessity, which will reduce the scope for disagreement in the face of the
need for finalising a clear policy. This will result in some views being privileged
and others being discounted. However, these NBOs are more capable of directly
shaping policy.

6. BIOETHICS, DIVERSITY AND DEMOCRATIC POLICY MAKING
In discussing the relationship between democratic decision-making and public
policy formation we focus on the process of debate through which a democratic
polity articulates the values held by the members of the polity, which then inform
policy makers. Liberal democracies are founded on the view that different
individuals or groups can and do hold different values as fundamental, and these
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differences ought to be respected in policy-making.7 Precisely how these
differences are to be respected is a matter of debate and we examine some of
the alternatives below.

The legitimacy of policy in democracies depends, in large part, on the public
deliberative processes that informed the policy: not on the substance of the
policy, but on the process or public reasoning used to determine it8. In saying this
we are not committed to a pluralist ethic, nor to the view that policies should be
based on either consensus or compromise. Policy makers will have to make
decisions, rank priorities among conflicting concerns and defend their policies on
a specific set of institutional values that may not reflect the full array of values of
those affected by the policy. Nonetheless, people who will be affected by policies
should have the opportunity to express their views about the matter in the
process of policy debate, and their contribution to the debate should not be
artificially constrained by that process (for example, an imposed limit on the
range of ethical issues that can be considered as part of the policy debate, or
constraints on the form of submissions to the policy-makers). The ideal is to
ensure that individuals have an authentic and effective voice in participating in
public deliberation about topics that affect them. Policy makers draw on that
public debate and engagement in setting the policy: the policy is thus informed by
the public deliberations of the people affected by the policy.

Thus, when we advocate the inclusion of public views in important policy debates
about bioethical issues, we do not have in mind the idea that public policy should
reflect some impossible-to-realise consensus view shared by all members of a
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society, nor do we assume that after a process of public deliberation the outcome
resolution will not later become contestable under new circumstances. The
resolution of the deliberation about how to negotiate plural values on ethically
contentious issues should not be assumed to be final determinations that could
not be re-opened in light of cultural or technological change. We are concerned,
nonetheless, to ensure that debate about these matters does not get captured
entirely by the interests of those deemed to be experts (or "guardian enclaves" 9),
nor by policy makers attempting to avoid contentious debate that could lead to
unpopular decisions. Instead we argue that those who are to be directly affected
by policy should have their say in the development of policy, and that all
participants in these policy debates have the opportunity to reflect on and
respond to expressions of the specific knowledge and experiences of the various
participants. The conception of democratic deliberation that we are drawing on
here, according to Cohen, “is rooted in the intuitive ideal of a democratic
association in which the justification of the terms and conditions of association
proceeds through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens”10. We
suggest how this might be addressed in the next section. It is worth noting here
Habermas’ summary of the procedures involved in this approach to public
reasoning:
(a) Processes of deliberation take place in argumentative form, that is,
through the regulated exchange of information and reasons among
parties who introduce and critically test proposals. (b) Deliberations are
inclusive and public. … [A]ll of those who are possibly affected by the
decisions have equal chances to enter and take part. (c) Deliberations are
free of any external coercion. … (d) Deliberations are free of any internal
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coercion that could detract from the equality of the participants. Each has
an equal opportunity to be heard, to introduce topics, to make
contributions, to suggest and criticize proposals. ….11

7. PUBLIC DEBATE ABOUT BIOETHICAL ISSUES: DELIBERATION AND
DEMOCRACY
The question of how NBOs ought to be understood and how they ought to go
about their business, when addressing issues over which there is no clear public
agreement about the ethical values at stake, is one specific manifestation of a
characteristic tension for any liberal democracy. This is the tension between
mere toleration of ethical differences and genuine respect for those differences in
policy-making, given the impossibility of ethically neutral policy-making in matters
that are the subject of hot ethical debate.

The legitimacy of public policies in liberal democratic states depends, in principle,
on the ability of the policy-maker to justify those policies to any reasonable
member of the society.12 Public decision-making processes that involve public
consultation can be described as searching for public consensus or as seeking
distributive modes of justification, a “fair” compromise between individual
preferences.13 Over the past three decades, liberal political philosophy has
worked to respond to challenges posed by feminists and communitarians in the
context of demands for recognition of group difference in policy-making within
pluralist societies14. These differences can strain the possibilities for meaningful
consensus or question the fairness of compromise, and it is unclear that there is
a neutral standing point that policy-makers can assume in their deliberations.15
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Although ‘overlapping consensus’16 may be found on many topics of public
policy, in the areas of bioethical policy in which NBOs are often called upon to
deliberate, there is frequently little ground for such consensus to be found.
Matters such as voluntary euthanasia, access to new reproductive technologies
or use of genetic information raise immediate questions about the values
endorsed by the society in which we may live: those of human life, intergenerational justice and individual privacy, to name just a few. Policy debate
about these matters can be extremely divisive, and they raise strongly held
ethical, religious and political views. Public understanding of science and public
articulation of social and ethical concerns become an integral part of the
decision-making underlying such policy development17. Unless the process of
public policy-making in these areas attends to the tensions and multiple valuesystems within society, the legitimacy of these policies will be called into
question. In what follows, we contrast approaches that seek consensus through
compromise between competing values with an approach that engages all
affected participants in a mode of deliberation towards the defensible resolution
of problems through public reasoning.18

8. THREE APPROACHES TO ETHICAL DIFFERENCE IN POLICY DEBATE.

Existing NBOs take a number of different approaches to debate, public
consultation, decision-making and contribution to policy formation in relation to a
specific set of ethical issues. For the purposes of this paper we will distinguish
among: ‘interest group pluralism’; ‘interest group pluralism coupled with public
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consultation’; and an approach that we will call ‘contested deliberation’. While
most actual NBOs use somewhat mixed approaches, we have sought to highlight
the tensions among these in a manner that exaggerates the effects of the
differences to demonstrate our concerns.

8.1 Interest group pluralism
According to Iris Young,
In the welfare capitalist society, processes of interest-group pluralism are
the vehicle for resolution of policy conflict about distributions. Clientconsumer citizens and corporate actors organize to promote specific
interests in receiving government goods—the oil lobby, the consumer
advocates and so on. New government programs often create interest
groups where they did not exist before. …Government policy and the
allocation of resources, according to pluralist theory, are the outcome of
this process of competition and bargaining among interest groups.19

This approach seeks consensus, understood as “fair compromise” through
drawing together a range of recognised representatives on aspects of the issue
who are taken to represent different “interest groups” or “stakeholders” and who
have as their task the development of a consensus that takes into account the
tensions between and among these interests. Representatives are identified
through their professional qualifications or expertise and/or the view that they
represent a specific set of public interests. For example, NBOs discussing
genetic manipulation will include geneticists, lawyers, philosophers, theologians,
disability activists, epidemiologists, health economists, clinicians and counsellors
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among their membership. The geneticists on the NBO can be seen as having
specific professional expertise and to represent the interests of genetic scientists
and clinicians, while the disability activists can be viewed as representing the
interests of people with disabilities and theologians represent the interests of
those who share religious concerns, and so on. If the individuals are understood
to be representatives of different interest groups and are asked to come to a
consensus based on the distinct interests of those interest groups, then the
outcome of the process may be a compromise that each of the participants can
agree to, given the competing interests of their constituencies.

One clearly contestable aspect of this approach is how interests meriting
representation and appropriate representatives for those interests are identified.
Some groups or interests will be represented simply because of uncritical
historical-cultural assumptions about what kinds of expertise are required for
these deliberations (such as the immediate inclusion of lawyers and religious
representatives on NBOs). Their inclusion may be appropriate, but ought to be
justified, given that representatives of other groups may have to demonstrate
their particular entitlements to be recognised as representatives of a relevant
interest. For example, representatives of people with disabilities, may have to
argue long and hard for a place in the deliberations because they lack
professional credentials for their status. Groups that are recognised by their
professional standing are likely to be advantaged in such a process, as they are
more likely to have access to resources to promote their cause. For example,
professional lawyers or academics can participate more readily in NBOs than can
other members of the community. They can take the time to attend the meetings
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without loss of income, have access to the resources that may be required to
prepare their case, and are often more familiar with the debating style and
methods of negotiation that are commonplace in such deliberations. These
representatives, with professional qualifications may also be assumed to be less
openly subjective in their deliberations than those who are members of socially
disadvantaged groups, because of their professional status: creating unequal
conditions for participation in deliberations.

Interest group pluralism also excludes the wider public from the debate; at least it
limits access to negotiations framing the debate. The deliberations between the
different interest groups are not made public, the compromises are not revealed
and there is no expression of a justification for why the outcome is framed in one
way rather than another. Compromises of this sort are neither accountable, nor
public.

Irwin says such expert-representatives achieve their exclusion by pre-framing the
debate of the issues and
..that this framing misses out on more pervasive problems and anxieties.
Equally, the construction of the exercise around issues likely to be
unfamiliar to participants and then providing factual information to
overcome their assumed ignorance, suggests a return to the deficit theory
of public groups as operating in a knowledge vacuum.20
The question of pre-framing is
a central issue for consultations of this kind, especially in emerging areas of
scientific concern where researchers will inevitably find themselves both
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generating and collecting public views about topics that have not previously
been considered - and doing so in an unavoidably artificial and
decontextualised fashion. 21

The subject matter of typical bioethical policy issues does require input from
experts, for instance, those in relevant medical or scientific disciplines. However,
it is less clear that the identification of ethical issues requires expertise, even if
articulating those issues into bioethical discourse does. Citizens arguably can
decide what for themselves is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, right or
wrong. However, expressing those intuitions or opinions in a discourse that can
be shared does require expertise in bioethics.

Critics of interest group pluralism note that it is an adversarial approach, and one
that can stifle genuine debate, by requiring each representative participant to
negotiate the “best outcome” given the interests of their group. Iris Young has
argued that interest group pluralism de-politicises public life, as no critical
distinction is made between the assertions of selfish interest and claims of justice
or right.

Public policy dispute is only a competition among claims, and ‘winning’
depends on getting others on your side, making trades and alliances with
others and making effective strategic calculations about how and to whom
to make your claims. One does not win by persuading a public that one’s
claim is just.22
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8.2 Interest group pluralism with public consultation
One approach that has been taken by many NBOs in attempting to avoid the
problems with interest group pluralism that we have identified is to combine the
interest group approach with some degree of public consultation. This approach
does not seek public participation in the debate, but asks for a public response to
a proposed policy determined by the interest groups’ negotiations. This is a
formal consultation that often does not allow for genuine public participation in
the debate. The reasons for this include the following. First, the scope of public or
stakeholder response is often very limited (e.g. in time frame, format of response,
the questions the public are asked to address). In this way, the “pre-framing” of
debate that Irwin criticised is perpetuated. Second, consultation is not genuinely
public, as only some groups will be approached directly and asked to respond.
Where public consultation is required, the public notices for submissions are
often buried in newspapers. Even if those notices are found, only those with time
and resources can respond effectively. Any particular submission will only have a
marginal effect, as, often, the policy makers will be obliged merely to “have
regard to” the comments made in the consultative process, but no obligation to
justify selective use of the material. Third, there is usually no public access to the
original submissions, which would allow for public scrutiny of the ways in which
submissions were used to shape policy.

Such confined or scripted consultation falls short of Amy Gutmann’s ideal of
deliberative democracy. She says
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At the core of deliberative democracy is the idea that citizens and officials
must justify any demands for collective action by giving reasons that can
be accepted by those who are bound by the action. When citizens morally
disagree about public policy, they therefore should deliberate with one
another, seeking moral agreement when they can and maintaining mutual
respect when they cannot.23

Equally, it would fall short of the social equality that, for Iris Young, is a goal of
social justice. This refers primarily to

…the full participation and inclusion of everyone in society’s major
institutions, and the socially supported substantive opportunity for all to
develop and exercise their capacities and realize their choices.24

The shortcomings of such formal and passive consultation have been recognised
and improved processes that achieve on-going interaction devised, often
engaging the power of information technology with positive effect.25

8.3 Contested deliberation
What appears to us to be needed is a hybrid derived from Gutmann’s deliberative
democracy and Young’s approach to social justice. There needs to be an
approach to deliberation that addresses the problem of correctly identifying
relevant expertise while ensuring the capacity of those experts to participate
effectively in deliberations of the NBOs. The identification of experts must be
seen as contestable and the process of participation as an NBO member needs
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to be sufficiently flexible (not cemented into bureaucratic practice) to allow for
effective and authentic participation by all members.

Secondly, the NBO’s deliberations and contribution to debate should, initially at
least, be viewed as preparatory to open and unscripted public participation. The
process of public discussion or consultation should be such as to allow genuine
deliberation and response by the citizenry. NBOs can open-up public debate by
providing or inviting well-informed, articulate expressions of the range of ethical
responses held by the community to the issue at hand. Thus, NBO members
need not directly mirror the diversity in the community, but need to reflect, be
sufficiently aware of, and present the different views held by parts of the
community in such a way that members of the wider community can see that
their various views are being brought into the discussions. In this sense the
NBOs have an obligation to explain the relevant issues in a manner that can be
understood and considered by the interested public. In this way, we seek a
merger or hybrid of the two models of NBOs discussed in section 4. We advocate
an approach that takes the deliberative advantages found in advisory NBOs
—suitably modified to approximate the reasoning, equality, inclusivity, publicity
and freedom conditions of Cohen’s ideal procedure— and the capacity to deliver
policy recommendations of NBOs with policy-making mandates —again modified
to promote deliberative procedures.

Clearly, not all views held by the community are such as can be coherently
expressed nor should views that are openly hostile to liberal democratic values of
equality and respect be presented as worthy alternative approaches in public
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policy formulation (e.g. views based on outright racism or denial of basic civil
rights). This distinction draws on Iris Young’s concerns about inclusion and full
participation of everyone in the society’s major institutions (for example
recognition of the civil rights of people with disabilities for equal opportunity to
participate in public life). NBOs do not have an obligation to defend positions that
are founded on the denial of recognition of diverse ethical stances, or the equal
rights of all to participation in public life.26 Rather NBOs should identify the
conflicts among the different views that are held in the community and be
prepared to defend or reconsider the NBO’s grounds for its contribution to the
debate. NBOs should be particularly concerned to reflect the diversity of views
held by those directly affected by the policies under consideration and to work
towards provisional and revisable agreement about policies that emerge from
debate informed by this diversity.

The approach we recommend here shares some features with the approach to
public reason defended by Duncan Ivison in his recent book Post-Colonial
Liberalism. Ivison develops a pragmatic approach to legitimate public reasoning
in those pluralist societies that include groups disadvantaged by historic injustice.
The approach to agreement about public policy he advocates is charactersised
by agreements that are “discursive modus vivendi”:
Discursive because they emerge from the constellation of discourses and
registers present in the public sphere at any given time, and subject to at
least some kind of ‘reflexive control’ by competent actors; and modus
vivendi because they are always provisional, open to contestation and by
definition ‘incompletely theorized’.27
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Our approach to the role of NBOs in bioethics policy formation is, therefore,
procedural, contestable and accountable. We believe this can be realised
through a three-stage process for policy deliberation in pluralist democratic
states. Stage one involves an open process of community hearings to determine
whether policy is required in this area, to seek reactions to positions previously
articulated by experts in the debate, and to allow presentation of community
view-points. Stage two involves an identification of appropriate representatives
and articulation of the relevant issues that emerged from the community hearings
and presentation of a range of possible positions in response to the demand for
policy and articulated concerns. The third stage involves the presentation of the
expert and community deliberations to an accountable, policy-making body that is
charged with developing policy that takes into account the range of views that
have been articulated in both of the previous stages.

9. BIOETHICS AND LIBERALISM IN DEMOCRATIC POLICY MAKING

Recognition of many of the dilemmas that we have tried to articulate can be
found in the June 1993 report of the United States Office for Technology
Assessment (OTA) on Biomedical Ethics in US Public Policy and some reactions
to it. The report reviewed the work and contributions of four NBOs; the 19741987 National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical
and Behavioural Research, the 1979-1983 President’s Commission for the Study
of Ethical problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research, the
1988-1989 Biomedical Ethics Advisory Committee and the more limited and non-
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Congressional 1977-1980 Ethics Advisory Board. Of these, the report accorded
success only to the 1979-1983 President’s Commission.

In a comment on this report published in the Hastings Center Report, Joseph
Palca considered that the success of the 1979-1983 President’s Commission
was due to the fact that it steered clear of political influence on generating its
reports, had adequate staffing and funding and had a broad mandate.28 In his
view, the predecessors and its immediate successor had not been sufficiently
free of either Congressional or executive influence. In the terms we have used,
this was a use of interest group pluralism by an advisory NBO that was
successful for articulating the bioethical issues because it was not established as
part of a policy making process. In our view, however, this approach is limited as
a means of influencing policy, precisely because of its separation from the policymaking processes.

In another response to the OTA report, George Annas suggests that any national
bioethics commission whose main job is, in effect, legislation (by regulation) will
focus its work at the lowest common denominator of ethics, namely, the law, and
not explore wider and deeper questions.29 In our terms, he identifies one of the
shortcomings of the second approach we outlined above, interest group pluralism
with public consultation. He rejects the OTA’s recommendation that Congress
“should provide a voice for biomedical ethics in public policy”, saying, “To the
extent that bioethics is a field based on principle rather than compromise, politics
can only corrupt it.”30 He concludes that the challenge for bioethics in America is
to learn more of politics so that it can influence politics without corrupting itself.
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This corruption will occur if, he says, bioethics makes it seem that “ethical
principles and practice are the result of compromise and majority votes rather
than reason and virtue.”31

There appears here to be an assumption about the nature of bioethics, as
somehow “outside” the social and political contexts that it critically examines, a
view that is likely to be challenged. Nonetheless, whatever conception of
bioethics is adopted, the important point is that processes involving NBOs need
to be informed by ethical intuitions and opinions articulated into bioethical
discourse by representatives and by public responses to a debate that is not
reduced to interest group pluralism with passive and procedural (rather than
substantive) public consultation. We advocate that at the third stage of policymaking on any NBO issue, there is a democratic obligation to demonstrate that
all defensible positions that have been articulated through the NBO process by
interested members of the wider community or by those with specific expertise
have been taken into account. This obligation can only be satisfied by drawing
recognisably bioethical views into debates framed to seek provisional agreement
about policy. For this to be seen (or heard) to happen, there needs to be general
agreement (but this agreement must also be contestable, hence open to
argument) about the range of views that can be appropriately labelled as
bioethical.

The contestability of the scope of bioethics and of democratic decision-making is
not a reason to abandon the project of finding out how bioethics can best
influence policy-making in a democracy marked by liberalism. Rather, it is
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recognition of the need for careful reflection on and identification of the
assumptions on which the design of NBOs and related policy making processes
rest. This paper has been our attempt to open that deliberative debate.32
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